Freud gave us not just two theories of the psyche but two kinds of theory of the psyche. One is about the structure and function of its subsystems. The other is about the nature and management of its contents. Freud's model of psychic structure and function is closely parallel to Kant's in a number of respects. (Equally, much in his theory of psychic content was anticipated by Schopenhauer. We have explored this relationship elsewhere (Young and Brook, 1994) .) Even though not just Freud's model of the mind but the model adopted in psychoanalysis long after Freud's death, the model adopted for example by ego psychology, was deeply Kantian, this feature of Freud's thought has never received much attention. The influences on Freud of German naturphilosophie and Helmholtzian mechanistic materialism has received attention (Holt 1963) .
Geisteswissenshaft (the intentional, teleological study of culture) has been discussed and so has Darwin. The role of Machian positivism in Freud's thought has been explored. But Kant is seldom mentioned.
1 Yet Kant's models and methods dominated the German-speaking world in the nineteenth century.
Moreover, Freud referred to Kant very frequently, more frequently in fact than to any other philosopher. 2 In the form of 19 th century Neokantianism, Kant's views gained their maximum prominence just at the time when Freud was thinking through his own model of the psyche in the 1890s (Freud 1895 and Chapter VII of 1900) , the model that would guide him for the rest of his life. Herbart, 1. Another major influence on German-speaking intellectual life in the latter part of the nineteenth century was the Romantic idealism of Hegel and his followers. Interesting, this school of thought seems to have had almost no influence on Freud. Hegel and Hegelian philosophy are only mentioned twice in the entire Standard Edition (S.E. 4:55 & S.E. 22:177) , and the only obviously Hegelian idea in Freud's work is the idea of projection. German intellectuals seem to have roughly divided into a Kantian camp and a Hegelian camp: science-lovers and speculators. In such a split, Freud would clearly have been a Kantian, despite a strong speculative streak in both his youth and his old age.
Freud's library, the part of it he took with him to London, is interesting with regard to the influences on him. (What information we have about the part he left behind is not reliable (Trosman and Simmons 1973; Bakan 1975 ).) He took Darwin's Gesammelte Werke (a translation), and most of Mach's works but, curiously, only one late work by Helmholtz and only two by Meynert. No Hegel, no Fichte, no Schelling, only one early work of Schopenhauer's. However, he took Nietzsche's Gesammelte Werke in 23 volumes and two books of Kant's, The Critique of Pure Reason, and Short Writings on the Philosophy of Nature (both in German, of course). The significance of the first of these will emerge shortly.
2.
Here are the figures: Plato (17), Aristotle (19) , Schopenhauer (25) , Lipps (26) , Nietzsche (17) , and Kant (28+, 16 by name plus at least a dozen more to his doctrines). Lipps is included, though he was a psychologist, because he was a prominent Kantian. Appendix A provides a complete list by subject of Freud's references to Kant or his doctrines. Many of them are not mentioned in Strachey's indexes, which are not entirely reliable.
Helmholtz, Meynert and even Lipps considered themselves to be Kantians. 3 For all these reasons, Freud must have been influenced by Kant. Yet Holt (1963) Reason, Understanding and Sensibility. The first two can be readily mapped onto Freud's Superego and Ego and there is even a connection between the third and Freud's Id -to show all this in some detail is a major goal of the current paper. Freud's theory of the relation of consciousness and language and therefore his demarcation of the unconscious is Kantian. Like Freud, Kant thought that a large and in many ways the most important part of the operation of the mind is 'unconscious' -not open to introspection, not conscious in Freud's sense of the term. For Kant as for Freud something can be or become conscious only if it is described, captured in language. Freud shared Kant's interest in how the mind can tie experiences together, and even used Kant's term, 'synthesis', as his name for the process.
Finally, as Freud himself was well aware, his doctrine of the unconscious (its timelessness, etc.) resonates with Kantian noumenalism (1915b, p. 171) . To all of this we will return.
Freud never mentioned Kant's view of the psyche. This is intriguing but perhaps less significant than might at first appear. Freud certainly knew about Kant's model. One would expect as much on general grounds but there is also have direct evidence. Freud owned a copy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781/7). I have examined it in the Freud Museum in London. It has some marginal markings running through the first 100 pages or so. The markings are neither extensive nor especially profound but Freud seldom marked his books at all, so the presence of any marginal notes is significant. He bought it in 1882 (Trosman and Simmons (1973, pp. 654 and 651) , exactly the year in which he first began to think about models of the psyche. Also, in his writeup of the Schreber case (1911a, p. 34), See Beck (1967b) . Jones (1953, I, 375) indicates that Meynert in particular was well-known as a Kantian. Meynert was one of Freud's principal teachers (Amacher 1965) . Beck (1967a and especially 1967b) gives a good description of Neo-Kantianism in the German-speaking regions in the late nineteenth century.
4.
The situation with respect to Schopenhauer is different. Parallels between Schopenhauer's views and Freud's have been known for a long time. Freud himself was aware of them. One of the things that make the study of these correspondences interesting is that Freud denied that he read Schopenhauer until late in life (for both points, see Freud 1925) .
Freud referred to the work, the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/7), by name in which Kant laid out his model (the comment Freud cites is on p. A58=B83).
The reason that Freud's never mentioning Kant's model of the psyche may not be very significant is this. In Freud's time, the Kantian model of the mind was so dominant that it was the universal view of the mind in German intellectual life. On this issue, hardly any German-speaking intellectual was not a Kantian. The Kantian foundation of his model of the mind may never have struck Freud as worth pointing out. Marie Bonaparte once said to him that he was a combination of Kant and Pasteur, apparently intending to pay him an enormous compliment (Jones 1955, II, p. 415) . This makes it clear that Kant was not just well-known to Freud's circle, he was a name to conjure with. The truth of Kant's model of the mind is not exactly self-evident to us now, however, so for us there is a need to lay out its role in Freud's thinking.
The study to follow will be hermeneutic rather than historical. That is to say, it will concentrate on relationships among texts, on drawing out parallels in doctrine and conceptual framework, rather than documented historical fact. I will not go very far into the question of why the relationships are there -whether, for example, they reflect direct influences or were just a matter of similar doctrines being developed independently. The relationships are interesting in their own right.
Kant's Tripartite Model of the Psyche
Here is a sketch-map of Kant's position.
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One can be aware only of one's own conscious states (phenomena). In order to be aware of even these, one must perform a number of intellectual operations on the raw material of them, which Kant called intuitions. First, intuitions must be 'run through and held together', which includes locating them in time and (some of them) in space. (The spatial part will appear to be external to oneself. 6 ) Second, earlier ones must be retained in the present so that they can be set beside current ones. Third, they must be organized under concepts (including the famous There is an interesting problem about what the word 'external' in 'external world' can mean in Kant. It cannot mean 'located outside me' because for Kant the whole of space is a state of the mind; intuitions are not spatial when they arrive in Sensibility but have spatial location imposed on them. (Kant says the same thing, even more bewilderingly, of time.) So 'external' can only mean 'not states of myself'. The notion cannot have any spatial connotation. categories of the understanding). All of this yields 'representations' (vorstellungen) . Finally, one must tie whole groups of these representations together into a system of representations, using for example causal concepts to do so. Only at this stage does one have experiences, at least of the full-blown conscious variety. The general name for these intellectual operations is synthesis.
The higher levels of synthesis are performed by a faculty called apperception. Apperception must be unified in the ways required for it to operate as a single subject of experiences and for it to become aware of itself as a single subject of experience. Apperception, its being unified and the possibility of it becoming aware of itself were extremely important to Kant, but apperception plays only a minor role in Freud, so we will say no more about it. (The minor role is in Freud's description of 'double conscience', splits of consciousness, and multiple personality (1915b, p. 170-1, and elsewhere).) Kant called the system which contains intuitions Sensibility. It has two subsystems, inner sense (roughly, intuitions of one's own psyche and soma) and outer sense (the intuitions which can be spatially organized.)
Understanding is his name for the system which works up these intuitions into representations.
It is the language-using system which does the thinking.
The Understanding in turn is governed by Reason. Kant assigned two functions to Reason. One was to generate the regulative principles which the Understanding needed to govern its operations. The other was to house the fundamental principles of morality, which could not be derived from experience.
The most fundamental of these was of course the categorical imperative. This part of Kant's Reason is a precursor of Freud's superego. In Kant's system reason is not a system like the other two and its status is always a bit murky. The same was true of Freud's view of what underpinned morality.
Freud's Kantian Model of Psychic Structure and Function
Freud's model of the structure of the psyche is strikingly like Kant's. Recall the distinction between theory of the structure and functions of the psyche -its main subsystems, driving principles, etc. -and theory of its content -phantasies, affects, dreams, introjects, character, etc. -and of how such contents are managed, the primary and secondary processes.
How different the two kinds of theory are in Freud is never clearer than in (1923) . There is a remarkable shift between Chapters I and II and Chapter III. Chapter I gives a list of ego functions and Chapter II (simplifying) a theory of how the system that performs these functions works and how it relates to perception. This is all structure and function. However, at the end of Chapter II something new suddenly appears, the claim that the ego is first of all a bodily ego, a projection (a model) of the surface of the body. This is not a point about ego functions. It is a point about the contents of the ego, specifically, about the representations or images (vorstellungen, bildes) it contains. Chapter III then articulates a full theory of contents, perhaps Freud's first full theory, beginning with the idea that a key part of content, namely character, is "a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes". Clearly, the two kinds of theory differ radically.
This fundamental distinction between structure and function, on the one hand, and content of representations, on the other, does not begin in 1923. Here is a clear instance of it from (1900). Freud has just warned against the dangers of picturing the psyche topographically:
We can avoid any possible abuse of this method of representation by recollecting that ideas, thoughts and psychical structures in general must never be regarded as localized in organic elements of the nervous system but rather, as one might say, between them, where resistances and facilitations provide the corresponding correlates. Everything that can be an object of our internal perception is virtual, like the image produced in a telescope by the passage of lightrays. But we are justified in assuming the existence of the systems (which are not . . . accessible to our psychical perception) like the lenses of a telescope, which cast the image. And, if we pursue the analogy, we may compare the censorship between the two systems to the refraction which takes place when a ray of light passes into a new medium [1900, p. 611 ].
This distinction between representations and the structures and functions which produce and contain and manage them (via the primary and secondary processes) had to wait until 1923 for clear elucidation but it was already clearly present in 1900. The Kantian antecedents are to Freud's theory of psychic structure, i.e., of the systems and forces and functions which generate and manage content. The distinction between structure and content should not be pushed too far. Character is a case in point. Though it was for Freud an entreé into content theory, it actually has a foot in both camps. It is a matter of contents, representations -what else would abandoned object-cathexes be? Yet it is more than just content, because character shapes and controls how content (experiences, thoughts, desires) is managed. Perhaps a computer analogy might be helpful. Computers have not two main elements but three. They have data (the analogue of content) and they have hardware (the analogue of structure). But they also have programming. This programming gives the hardware its functions, it capabilities. But it is also content. Character seems in a similar way to be both function and content. 1895 (libido, the Id) and an ego system like the ego of 1895 (the ego of 1911b and 1917, the Ego of 1923). All of them also had a self-judging element, though it only took its final shape as the Superego in 1923. And all of them remained drive-discharge theories. Though the third part of his model was fully articulated only in 1923, Freud's image of the psyche was fundamentally tripartite from start to finish. As, of course, was Kant's.
Freud's Model Face to Face with Kant's
Tripartite models of the psyche have been around at least since Plato but it was Kant who brought tripartite modelling to prominence in German thought. Few models of the psyche have ever been more influential. to which it corresponds most closely. Not all the correspondences are perfect, of course, a matter to which we will return. From top to bottom, here is how the two models relate to one another.
Noumena-Unconsciousness:
The section labelled 'Noumenal self' has been left blank because Kant taught that we cannot say anything about it. Though Freud's notion of the unconscious was certainly influenced by Kant's doctrine, he never thought it to be either as mysterious or as opaque as Kant held the noumenal to be (Freud 1915b, p. 171 ). We will return to this topic in Section 6. Phenomena-Preconscious: Though Kant did not explicitly distinguish representations that one is aware of having (consciousness) from those one is not but could become aware of having (preconsciousness), he knew of the distinction (1781/7, pp. A103, A117fn., B132), and like Freud contrasted both with something vastly larger of which we cannot become aware, namely the noumenal self. While he certainly believed that there is a great deal about psychic structure of which we are and must remain unconscious, he never spoke about whether there are representations which are not just pre-conscious but truly unconscious. (Preconscious representations that can be made conscious at will, unconscious ones cannot be). Categorical Imperative-Superego: Freud himself saw his Superego as closely related to Kant's categorical imperative. As he once put it, "Kant's categorical imperative is ... the direct heir of the Oedipus complex." (1924, p. 167, see also 1923, 35, 48) . The Superego goes far beyond the categorical imperative, of course. Kant would never have dreamt that there even are such things as parental introjects, let alone that they could have anything to do with the categorical imperative. But it is also less than the categorical imperative. Kant used the notion to attempt to ground a certain ethical theory, namely, the deontological theory that we can deduce what we should do from extremely general first principles such as the categorical imperative. Not only did Freud not follow him in this; Freud paid little attention to the issue of justifying moral beliefs in any form. Self-Consciousness-Cs: Probably the most complicated aspect of both these models is how consciousness appears in them. For in both of them it appears twice -in Kant as a heading (in the form of Phenomena; phenomenal states are conscious states) and as an aspect of the Understanding, and in
Freud's as a heading and as a subsystem of the Ego. This confusing parallel is interesting.
Freud first. As is well-known, he treated consciousness as both a subsystem of the Ego (Cs; the T (omega) system of 1895), and also as a quality that some of the contents of any system can have.
Though he was never very clear about the matter, he seems to have held that a representation gains the quality of being conscious by becoming available to the system Cs, the system which is sensitive to this quality.
Consciousness as a quality is in a direct line of descent from Freud's interest in it was lifelong. As early as 1895, he had noted that acts of judgment bring about a "psychological unity" by synthesizing stimuli into experience of objects (p. 384) and over forty years later this fact still interested him (1938a, p. 276).
Outer Sense-External Perception: Here we will add only one comment to what we have already said -Freud did not ever develop a complete theory of perception, either of the inner or the outer. In 1895, he treated outer perception as a separate system, the system, distinct from both consciousness and the ego. This is what we have reflected in Figure I . Later, the only sort of perception he explicitly distinguished was the sort which involved (self-) consciousness, the system Pcpt.-Cs., though he seems to have continued to use the term to cover preconscious access to the external world, too, as we have Figure I ), they correspond in Kant to inner sense.
?-Id: Nothing in Kant's models compares directly to Freud's notion of the Id. We will return to this issue at the end of the paper.
Kant and Freud on Concepts and Percepts
Another significant correspondence between Kant and Freud concerns their view of the relationship between perception and description. They viewed the relationship in much the same way.
Moreover, Freud used this relationship to define the unconscious. Just about the most famous remark Kant ever made was this:
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [1781/7, p.
A51=B75].
I want to focus on the second half of this saying, that intuitions (percepts) without concepts are blind.
Freud held precisely the same view. He put it this way. A 'thing-presentation' (a percept, a representation of an object or a state of affairs) cannot become conscious unless it is linked to 'wordpresentations'. "A presentation which is not put into words . . . remains . . . in the Ucs. " (1915b, p. 202 The next couple of moves are important but their importance is matched by their obscurity. For energy from the perception to be directed to the right mnemic image, namely one similar to it, the mnemic image must itself be perceptible, enter consciousness (p. 364). In addition, the information from the image thus perceived must be discharged back to the Ego, to the mechanism of attention which guides the flow of energy from the original perception to the correct memories. So far there is no reason to think that language is required. Note what this argument actually does and does not claim. It does not claim that language is necessary for all forms of conscious recall of memories. But it does claim that language is necessary for conscious recall in any form which could be used by the secondary process. Perhaps the best way to put the point is this: a memory can only be consciously managed if what is remembered can be described.
(Freud saw implications in this point for the nature of the processes underlying repression and splitting (Brook 1992 Freud's argument would probably not stand up to scrutiny. For one thing, it seems to require that even thinking of a word discharges a small quotient (a very small quotient (1895, p. 367)) of energy from one psychic system to another. But it is an argument. And that is noteworthy. Few views of Kant's are more plausible or have had more influence than the view that thinking and self-aware experiencing (consciousness in Freud's sense) necessarily involve the use of language. Yet very few arguments for the view exist, in Kant or elsewhere. The fact that Freud actually had an argument for the view is noteworthy.
The idea that consciousness requires language is connected to one further Kantian strain in Freud. Like Kant but unlike most psychologists, Freud put memory front and centre in his theory. He even used Kant's terminology, speaking for example of 'reproductive' thought (1895, p. 319) (Kant: 'reproductive imagination' (1781/7, pp. A100-2 ). Freud's theory of the nature of memory richly deserves a proper study in its own right.
Is the Structure of the Psyche Innate or Acquired?
8.
Note that the other half of Kant's saying, that thoughts without content are empty, also anticipated a doctrine of Freud's, this time about schizophrenia. In schizophrenia, Freud held, word-presentations have become detached from thing-presentations, that is, from their referents, their content. Moreover, Freud made this claim in the same passage in which he laid out the doctrine of the unconscious which parallels the other half of Kant's famous remark ((1915b), p. 196-204) .
One fundamental difference between the Kant's and Freud's models, a difference not reflected in Figure I , concerns innateness. Kant thought that Reason and the Understanding are innate. They must exist fully developed and ready for action prior to the first experience, since the functions they perform (organizing intuitions and capturing them in concepts) are required to have experience at all and so must preexist all experience. For Kant, indeed, more is innate in Reason than its cognitive functions. Its moral side is innate, too. That the categorical imperative, the foundation of all morality, is morally binding is built into us. Freud by contrast held that the Ego and most everything it could do were acquired from experience, specifically from having to defend against conflicts generated by the drives. Morality, the content of the Superego, was similarly not innate but acquired, by introjections and narcissistic projections. Related to this, Freud thought of his model as something discovered empirically, not derived a priori reasoning about the mind and its necessary conditions. Thus, unlike Kant, he had little interest in claims as to how things have to be. He was happy enough if he could discover how they in fact are. On these issues, Kant retained vestiges of the old rationalism while Freud was already completely a child of the new Weltanschauung of biological empiricism with us still today.
Freud and Kant's Noumena
Earlier we said that, for Kant, all we can be directly aware of are states of our own mind, what he called phenomena. What about everything else? Indeed, is there anything else? For Kant there is. He called it the 'ding an sich' or the noumenal. 'Noumenal' just means 'unknowable'. Kant held that we cannot know things as they are, just things as they appear to us. Unknowable 'dingen an sich' underlie two vital aspects of the mind. The source of our intuitions, intuitions both of inner sense (of our own psyche and soma) and of outer sense (of the external world), are unknowable. And the mind as it is, the thing that works intuitions up into experiences, is also unknowable. We know of the mind only as it appears to us in inner sense, not as it is. Thus, both the source of intuitions and actual nature of the apparatus that works them up into conscious experiences must remain forever beyond experience (in Freud's terms, unconscious) . Though they produce experience, they can never themselves be experienced. (According to Beck, Herbart held the same view (Beck 1967a, p. 305) .) This view of Kant's made a profound impression on Freud.
The noumenal is the source of the contents not only of outer sense but also of inner sense. Inner sense is our awareness of our own psyche and soma. Freud was certainly interested in the idea that outer sense (our experience of the external world) had a noumenal, 'unconscious' source, but he had an interesting attitude to Kant's other idea, that inner sense has a noumenal base, too. Here is what he said:
Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psychoanalysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what is appears to us to be [1915b, p. 171] .
In this passage Freud recognizes that his ideas about the limits of the knowability of the external world are derived from Kant (see also 1920, p. 28; 1938b, 150, p. 196; 1938c, p. 300) , but says that it is psychoanalysis that warns us that perceptions by means of consciousness are not to be "equated with the unconscious mental processes which are their objects. Psychoanalysis? Kant had had this idea, too, over 100 years before Freud formulated it. Here is Kant: inner sense . . . represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. . . . I . . . know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am . . . So far as inner intuition is concerned, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself [1781/7, pp. B152-6].
Kant is saying here that the sources of inner sense are as opaque to consciousness as are the sources of outer sense. That is to say, he held exactly the same view about the unknowability of the sources of the internal world as he held about the external world. This thought is a clear anticipation of Freud's notion of the unconscious. Indeed, Freud's Q and M systems of 1895 are pretty much Kant's noumenal psyche under a different name.
Fortunately, Freud did not accept the draconian restrictions that Kant placed on knowledge of the noumenal: for Freud, "internal objects are [merely] less unknowable than the external world" (my emphasis). Kant had urged that both the internal and the external world as they really are totally unknowable. All we can be aware of is how they appear to us.
Kant's views on the nature of things are they are in themselves (the noumena) also had a direct influence on how Freud viewed the nature of the unconscious. For Kant, the noumenal cannot be spatial or temporal, space and time being merely forms imposed by the mind on sensible experience. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of these claims but notice what Freud says about them.
As a result of certain psychoanalytic discoveries, we are today in a position to embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and space are [merely] 'necessary forms of thought'. We have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in themselves 'timeless'. This means in the first place that they are not ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of time cannot be applied to them . . . . On the other hand, our abstract idea of time seems to be wholly derived from the method of working of the system Pcpt.-Cs.
and to correspond to a perception on its own part of that method of working . . . . I know these remarks must sound very obscure [1920, p. 28] .
Curiously, Freud himself did not take the timelessness of the unconscious literally. Freud did not ever deny, for example, that unconscious processes start (in time), can be modified by psychoanalysis " (1938c, p. 300) . This is simply Kant's idea that space is imposed on reality by the mind.
(Apparently Helmholtz, the founder of the school of medicine in which Freud was trained, also held this view of space (Beck 1967b, p. 469) ). In sum, Freud's notion of the unconscious psyche corresponds quite closely to Kant's doctrine that we cannot know the psyche as it really is.
The Id
So far we have said nothing about Freud's Id. 'Id' was a term that Freud began using in 1920.
Before that, he talked about libido, the unconscious source of what he called our 'drive derivations' -our conscious desires, fears, loves, hates, and so on. There is no anticipation of this notion in Kant. To find its antecedents, we would have to turn to Schopenhauer. Unfortunately, we cannot do so here (see Young and Brook 1994 , where the doctrinal links between Freud and Schopenhauer are examined). If we push the notion of the Id far enough back in Freud, we can eventually find a link to Kant, however. 
Coda on Freud's Attitude to Philosophy
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Given that Freud was well aware of major philosophers who not only knew about unconscious mental life but put it at the centre of their systems, philosophers as major as Kant and Schopenhauer, some of the things he said about philosophy are surpassingly strange. For example, To most people who have been educated in philosophy the idea of anything psychical which is not also conscious is so inconceivable that it seems to them absurd and refutable simply by logic . . . . Their psychology of consciousness is incapable of solving the problems of dreams and hypnosis [1923, p. 13] .
This from somebody whose youth was steeped in German romanticism! As Ellenberger notes, In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the philosophical concept of the unconscious, as taught by Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, was extremely popular, and most contemporary philosophers admitted the existence of an unconscious mental life [1970, p. 311 ].
Freud had to have been aware of this. For example, we know that he read von Hartmann, who had popularized Schopenhauer in his widely read The Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869) and works of the 1870's (Brandell 1979, 93) 
